Why Scholars Disagree (Series)
(Part 1)
Dr. Taha Jabir Al-`Alawani is the President of the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences.Differences of opinion on intellectual issues, and –by extension- on juristic ones as well, are natural on account of the inherent disparities in intelligence, understanding, and analytic capacity with which people are created. If we accept that this statement is valid, then we must also accept that differences of opinion between several Companions during the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the rightly-guided Caliphs did occur, and these have been well documented. We would be doing a disservice to this religion if we denied this phenomenon. By the same token, we do not regard an open discussion of these differences as detracting from the purity of the Islamic message or from the sincere intention of those Companions who had differences. Indeed we can say that in mentioning these differences openly we are in fact testifying to the objective reality and validity of the Islamic religion.
Islam treats people on the basis that they are human beings who, because of a variety of factors, are often at variance with the naturally pure state in which they were created. What is comforting to the believer, however, is that the differences of opinion among the Companions did not spring from weakness in belief (`aqeedah) or any skepticism as to the truth of the Prophet's teachings. Instead, they resulted from a genuine desire to ascertain the truth through patient investigation and discover the purpose of the Lawgiver.Natural Differences
So long as the Prophet was the source of these laws, we find that no disagreement lasted longer than it took to refer it to him. From what we have said above about early Muslim history, we can say that the causes of differences of opinion in most cases hinged on the linguistic and juristic interpretation of Qur'anic texts and the interpretation of the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be on him.) There were certainly no hidden malicious motives behind these differences, much to the disappointment of the hypocrites who were bent on sowing the seeds of discord in the community. This accounts for the ease and the speed with which these differences dissipated as soon as the disputants met the Prophet or as soon as a relevant text was produced by anyone. From the Companions' attitude, we can see the soundness of the saying that one who possesses a sound natural disposition (fitrah) supports truth wherever he finds it.
It is to be expected that some differences and the reasons behind them should have been passed on from one age to another –there is no way of restricting these differences to a given period. However, with the rapid spread of Islam after the demise of the Prophet, there surfaced new and more critical issues in the Islamic sphere which have in turn contributed to the spirit of disagreement.
After the Assassination of the Third Caliph
The cities of Kufah and Basrah emerged as centers of intellectual activity. They also provided a fertile ground for the exchange of political ideas and the proliferation of various sects such as the Khawarij, the Shi`ah, and the Murji’ah[1] as well as the Mu`tazilah, the Jahmiyah and other speculative and deviant groups.In particular, since the assassination of the third Caliph, `Uthman ibn `Affan, the new regions to which Islam had spread were exposed to violent agitations. This imparted a new and completely alien dimension to the previously staid tradition of differences of opinion. The atmosphere of political agitation and uncertainty impelled people of every city and town to become more protective of whatever knowledge of the Prophet's Sunnah they had. They were wary of attempts to corrupt or fabricate traditions.
At this time, there were as many intellectual and rationalist tendencies as there were groups, with each group formulating its own methods and principles for interpreting the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah and for dealing with new controversies. There was a pressing need to put in place some controls for regulating the situation, for specifying the methodologies that could be used for deriving positive laws from the divine revelation, and for specifying what was allowed and what was not in the conduct of controversies.
On the basis of the knowledge available to him, a jurist may pronounce a judgment which may actually conform to what the Lawgiver intends, or it may not. Whatever the outcome, he is not required to do more than exert the utmost of his intellectual effort to arrive at a judgment. It is likely that his judgment may coincide with the purpose of the Lawgiver or be as close as possible to it in essence, purpose, and effect.Fortunately, the very principle of allowing differences of approach in matters of jurisprudence (fiqh) was generally accepted. These were matters of detail and required, to begin with, a highly specialized knowledge of evidence from the Qur'an and Sunnah. The word "fiqh" literally means understanding. By extension, it is used to denote the particular understanding which a jurist or faqih (literally 'one who understands') brings to certain issues. The word fiqh also refers to the body of knowledge, rulings, and judgments which comes from a jurist's understanding of issues in the light of clearly defined principles.
Given this approach, difference of opinion was therefore regarded as legitimate provided it fulfilled two conditions:
1. Each disputant must have evidence or proof (dalil) to authenticate his argument. Failure to provide such evidence would invalidate an argument.
2. The adoption of a divergent opinion should not lead to anything preposterous or false. If the opinion is manifestly false from the beginning, it should be abandoned straight away.
These two conditions illustrate the difference between ikhtilaf, which suggests a justifiable difference of opinion, and khilaf, which is more akin to discord. Ikhtilafpresumes that sincere intellectual effort is exerted to arrive at a judgment; on the whole, it represents an objective methodology. Khilaf, on the other hand, departs from one or both conditions mentioned above. It is a manifestation of impulsiveness and obstinacy. It has no link with objectivity.
The jurists whose schools of thought were variously adopted by the Ummah as a whole adhered steadfastly to the two conditions mentioned above: providing necessary evidence to authenticate an argument and abandoning any position that was patently preposterous. Legal historians are not at all unanimous in specifying the causes of the juristic differences in that period in spite of the vast literature on the theme. The causes, nevertheless, could be attributed to three main factors: linguistic factors, factors pertaining to the transmission of hadith, and factors pertaining to the principles and rules of deduction[2].
Notes:
[1] The Murji'ah or "Deferrers" is a sect which derives its name from the word irja' which means postponing or deferring. They defer judgment of a sinner to God and the Day of Judgment. They consider that where there is faith, sin or wrongdoing does no harm; similarly where there is unbelief (kufr) right action is of no benefit. This position is contrary to accepted Islamic belief.
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